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Summary 
The Former Presidents Act, P.L. 85-745, 72 Stat. 838,' as amended, 3 U.S.C. $ 102 
note, makes provision for a monetary allowance for former Presidents, payable monthly, 
at an annual rate equal to that of the head of an executive department as defined in 5 
U.S.C. $101. The allowance is not paid during any period when the former President 
holds an appointive or elective office or a position in or under the Federal government or 
' P.L. 85-745,72 Stat. 838 (Aug. 25, 1958); as amended by P.L. 86-682, 4 12(c), 74 Stat. 
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95-138, 4 1, 91 Stat. 1170 (Oct. 18, 1977); P.L. 103-123, Title IV, 4 6(a), 107 Stat. 1246 (Oct. 
28, 1993); P.L. 103-329, Title V, 4 531, 108 Stat. 2413 (Sept. 30, 1994); P.L. 104-52, Title V, 
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the District of Columbia government at other than a nominal rate of pay. The Act also 
provides for selection, compensation and status of office staff for former Presidents, as 
well as provision of appropriately furnished and equipped office space. A widow's 
allowance is also provided for the widow of each former President at a rate of $20,000 per 
annum, paid monthly, if she waives the right to every other annuity or pension to which 
she is entitled under any other Act of Congress. This allowance continues until the last 
day of the month before she dies or remarries before age 60, and is not payable for any 
period during which she holds an appointive or elective office or position in or under the 
Federal government or the District of Columbia government at other than a nominal rate 
of pay. In addition, the Act authorizes appropriations for security and travel related 
expenses for each former President and the spouse of each former President, where the 
former President or spouse was not receiving lifetime protection by the United States 
Secret Service under 18 U. S.C. 5 3056(a)(3); where the protection of the Secret Service 
expired at its designated time; or where the protection provided by the Secret Service was 
declined prior to authorized expiration in lieu of these funds. 
Under subsection (f) of the Former Presidents Act, the term "former President" is 
defined to include those who have held the office of President of the United States of 
America, who are not currently holding that office, and whose service in that office "shall 
have terminated other than by removal pursuant to section 4 of article I1 of the 
Constitution of the United States of America". Article 11, Section 4, provides that: 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 5, the House of Representative has the "sole Power of 
Impeachment." The Senate, under Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, has the "sole Power to 
try all Impeachments." Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 states that: 
Judgment in cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust 
or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be 
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to 
Law. 
The decision as to whether to convict on each of the articles of impeachment in a given 
proceeding must be made separately. A conviction on any one of the articles of 
impeachment brought against an individual subject to impeachment is sufficient to 
constitute conviction in the impeachment trial. Should a conviction occur, judgment is 
limited to either removal from office or removal and prohibition from holding future 
offices of public trust under the United States. The precedents in impeachment suggest 
that removal may flow automatically &om conviction in an impeachment trial, but that the 
Senate must vote to prohibit the individual from holding future offices of public trust, if 
that judgment is also deemed appropriate in a given case. Conviction on impeachment 
does not foreclose the possibility of criminal prosecution arising out of the same factual 
situation. 
In light of the language in the Former Presidents Act, one consequence of removal 
of a President from office as a result of a conviction in an impeachment trial would be that 
the individual involved would no longer fit within the definition of "former President" for 
purposes of the Act. He would therefore not be eligible to receive the benefits available 
under the Act's provisions. It would seem to follow that his spouse or widow would also 
be ineligible to receive those benefits available under the Act to the spouse or widow of 
a "former President." Because of the way in which "former President" is defined in 
subsection (f) of the Act, it would appear also that if a President were to be the subject of 
an impeachment trial, but not convicted on any article of impeachment and therefore not 
removed from office, he would remain within the definition of "former President" for 
purposes of the Act. Further, if a President resigned from office before impeachment 
proceedings were initiated, or during an impeachment proceeding, but before conviction 
on any article, he would not have been removed from office pursuant to the impeachment 
process, and therefore he would still seem to fit within the definition of "former President" 
under the Act.* 
It may be noted that resignation before impeachment proceedings are initiated or completed 
may lead the House of Representatives or the House and the Senate to decide not to pursue 
impeachment procedmgs. See, e.g., H. Res. 803; Impeachment ofRichardM. Nixon, President 
of the United States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 
H. R. Rept. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in which the House Committee on the Judiciary 
filed its report on its impeachment inquiry with respect to President %chard M. Nixon with the full 
House, includmg a resolution impeach President Nixon and setting forth articles of impeachment 
against him. Because President Nixon resigned from office, the House did not vote on the 
resolution and took no further action with respect to impeachment of the former President. See 
also, the impeachment of George W. English, District Judge for the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Illinois, 1925-26. There the House impeached and voted articles against 
Judge English, and the House Managers appeared before the Senate to advise the Senate of the 
House action and to begin the process which would lead to a Senate trial. Judge English resigned 
six days before the scheduled start of the Senate trial on his impeachment. The House Managers 
recommended to the House that the impeachment proceedings be discontinued, while stating that 
the resignation did not affect the Senate's authority to try the matter. The House voted to accept 
the Managers7 recommendation. 68 Cong. Rec. 297 (1926), discussed in a Committee Print 
entitled Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by the StaH of the 
Impeachment Iiupiry, Committee on the Judciary House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
52-54 (Feb. 1974). The Senate, having been advised by the House Managers that the House 
wished to discontinue the proceedings in light of Judge English's resignation, passed a resolution 
dismissing the impeachment proceedings. 68 Cong. Rec. 344,348 (1 926). 
On the other hand, in 1876, Secretary of War Bellcnap resigned from office just before the 
adoption of impeachment articles against him by the House of Representatives. The Senate, after 
having given exhaustive consideration to the arguments of the House Managers and counsel for the 
respondent, concluded that the former Secretary of War was amenable to trial by impeachment for 
acts done in that office, despite his resignation from office before he was impeached. Belknap7s 
demurrer to the replication of the House on the ground that the Senate lacked jurisdiction to go 
forward with the impeachment was therefore overruled. I11 Hinds ' Precedents of the House of 
Representatives 8 2007, at 321. It may be noted that Belknap was acquitted of the charges brought 
agamst hlrn in the articles of impeachment, those voting in favor of conviction falling short of the 
requisite two-thirds of those Members present. Th~s  acquittal seems to have reflected, in part, a 
residual level of concern on the part of some of the Senators as to the wisdom of trymg an 
impeachment of a person no longer in office. Two of the 37 voting "guilty" and 22 of the 25 voting 
"not guilty" stated that they believed the Senate lacked jurishction in the case. I11 Hinds' 
Precedents of the House of Representatives 92467, at 945-46. 
